With characteristic sharpness Kelsen's review dismissed the whole of Ehrlich's project. He asserted that a sociology of law in the manner Ehrlich proposed it was impossible, without quite disclosing the grounds on which he based such a forceful critique. Instead, Kelsen had recourse to an argument about Ehrlich's 'syncretism of methods' and, despite his text running to almost 40 pages in length, he refused to engage with Ehrlich's work on its own terms. At the end of his rejoinder, Ehrlich complained that 'Kelsen's critique gives absolutely no idea of the actual content of my book '. 4 I felt the same absence of engagement with my wider argument in Kammerhofer's text, and although I understand both Kelsen's and Kammerhofer's standpoint in protecting their particular project, I cannot fail to point to the limitations, not to say narrowness, of their method. In particular, the method used in the exposition of their arguments misleadingly denies that jurisprudence, especially international jurisprudence, has an impact on reality, and that like any other science it contributes to explaining reality.
As to 'translations' and 'context', Kammerhofer is convinced neither by my translations nor by my reading of Kelsen's text. In this respect, he refers to a problem he terms 'context insensibility', 5 while at the same time failing to accept Wolfgang Kraus's translation, which was approved by Kelsen himself.
6 Does this mean that he is becoming more Catholic than the Pope? For my part, I am afraid that I am equally uneasy with his translations and contextualizations. Let me for the sake of brevity simply take the very example Kammerhofer uses -the quotation from Kelsen's Die philosophischen Grundlage der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus:
The question, however, of how the content of the positive legal order comes about [in fact], which are the [socio-political] factors which cause the content to take this form, is already part of a different, alien [scholarly] method, a method which does not aim at the cognition of a normative order in its validity as Ought. If this [other question] is asked, we will hardly be able to avoid the -not very telling -insight.
And he comments:
At this point, the passage cited by García-Salmones begins. It is clear that the 'not very telling … insight' that is to follow can thus not serve as basis for the legal theory discussed.
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I can accept Kammerhofer's translation up to a point, although he has omitted the word 'answer'. Here is mine:
If this [other question] is asked, we will hardly receive any other answer than the [following] -not very telling -insight: every legal order, with its necessary level of efficiency bound to its condition of positivity … represents a balance of groups of interests opposed among themselves, which strive to attain power; that is to say, to achieve the inner configuration of the social order. These social forces appear in their struggle for power always behind the mask of justice and always avail themselves of the ideology of natural law. They act by no means as what they really are, as mere factional interests (Gruppeninteressen), but pretend to represent the 'true' (interest), which if not recognised actually by everyone as such, appears indeed as the 'well-understood' common interest. As is evident from the Preface to H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945), at xviii. 7 Kammerhofer, supra note 5, at 797. Kelsen's statement that 'the question of how the content of the positive legal order is brought about' ('Die Frage, wie der Inhalt der positiven Rechtsordnung zustande kommt') has, in Kelsen's own words, 'no other answer' ('kaum eine andere Antwort') than the one that he spells out in the previous paragraph. That Kelsen found that that answer was, as an insight, not very telling simply confirms my argument. On the one hand it shows that Kelsen took that answer for granted; while for others the debate starts precisely with the attempt to provide an answer to that question. On the other hand, it helps to show that Kelsen had a reply to the question of content readily to hand, dispelling the myth that he was oblivious to the content of law and only concerned with 'ought' questions of legal science. Similar quotations, views, and themes appeared throughout Kelsen's entire oeuvre.
The aim of my project was to make a comprehensive study of Kelsen's work, and more generally of international positivism, not by adopting a method of 'separating the principled opposition of Sein and Sollen, content and form', 9 but rather by using the opposite method: through 'a study of the content and of the form of positivist international law '. 10 This method led, among other things, to the finding that Kelsen partook of a tradition of interests that has been very influential in the history of modern European public law, and that he was possibly its last great representative. At the outset of the research this finding was unexpected, and now it deprives Kelsen of nothing but an obscure air of mysticism.
